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Ms. Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0210 
Re: Alder, et al v. AGFA Corporation, et al 
Case No. 20000937-SC 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
This firm represents Defendants/Appellees Bayer Corporation (formerly known as 
named Defendant Miles, Inc.) and Agfa Corporation (collectively "AGFA") in the above-
referenced matter. AGFA writes pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure to advise the Court of two new cases that are pertinent to this matter and, 
AGFA respectfully submits, should be reviewed by the Court prior to oral argument. 
Both cases address the admissibility of expert testimony on causation based upon 
a purported "differential diagnosis" performed by a physician. In the first case, 
Glastetter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals, Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001), the 
Court excluded expert testimony based upon a "differential diagnosis" where there was 
no basis for "ruling in" an agent as a potential cause of the plaintiffs alleged injury, 
before "ruling it out" by means of a proper differential diagnosis. In the second case, 
Holstine v. Texaco, No. CJ-97-221, 2001 WL 605137, at *3 (D. Okl. April 16, 2001), the 
Court excluded plaintiffs physician's "differential diagnosis," reasoning that "[t]he 
underlying predicate for any cause-and-effect medical testimony is that medical science 
understands the physiological process by which a particular disease or syndrome 
develops and knows what factors cause the process to occur," and without such evidence 
a differential diagnosis is "without support, flawed and not relevant." 
These recent cases support the trial court's ruling below that appellants' experts' 
proffered "differential diagnosis" testimony is inadmissible and insufficient to prove 
exposure and medical causation. Appellees respectfully request that these citations be 
added to the Brief of Appellees Bayer Corporation and AGFA Corporation at page 33. 
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Ms. Pat Bartholomew 
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Thank you for the Court's consideration of this request. 
Respectfully submitted, 
David M. Bennion 
DMB/rlk 
cc: Peter Collins, Esq. 
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LIST OF PARTIES 
Appellants Leslie Alder (now known as Leslie Roberts) ("Ms. Alder") and Jackie 
Jones ("Ms. Jones") filed their Complaint naming three Defendants: (1) Miles, Inc.; (2) 
Agfa Corporation; and (3) Bayer Corporation. However, by mutual stipulation, the 
parties agreed after commencement of suit that the case would proceed against Bayer 
Corporation, Agfa Division as the sole Defendant. Since that time, Agfa Corporation was 
formed and succeeded in interest to Bayer Corporation, Agfa Division. Therefore, the 
motion below for summary judgment was filed on behalf of Bayer Corporation, Agfa 
Division and Agfa Corporation. Both entities (referred to hereinafter collectively as 
"AGFA") are Appellees on this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Whether the District Court soundly exercised its discretion in applying 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), to exclude 
plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony on Multiple Chemical Sensitivity ("MCS") for lack of 
reliable scientific techniques and principles. 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony and decisions to exclude expert testimony are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 1997). An appellate court can 
properly find such abuse of discretion only if no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the lower court. Id. 
Issue #2: Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendants based upon the absence of evidence that plaintiffs were exposed to 
chemicals at levels known to cause injury in general, or MCS in particular. 
On appeal from a summary judgment, an appellate court will review the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness and will affirm summary judgment if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. AMS Salt Indus, v. Magnesium Corp., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997). 
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Issue #3: Whether the District Court correctly ruled that defendants owed no 
duty to plaintiffs to control the operation or installation of the ventilation system at LDS 
Hospital. 
On appeal from a summary judgment an appellate court will review the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness and will affirm summary judgment if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. AMS Salt, 942 P.2d at 319. Whether a duty exists is a question of law that the Court 
reviews for correctness. Id. 
Issue #4: Whether the District Court's ruling should be affirmed on the 
alternative ground (raised below on defendants' prior motion for summary judgment) that 
all of plaintiffs' claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah's 
Product Liability Act. 
This Court may affirm the District Court's summary judgment order on any ground 
appearing in the record, whether relied upon by the District Court or not. Salt Lake County 
v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d. 384, 386 (Utah 1996). Whether a statute of limitations has expired 
is a question of law that the Court reviews for correctness. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 
P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah 1999). 
DETERMINITIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
This appeal turns primarily upon issues of common law, rather than upon the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, and ordinances. However, the 
determination of this appeal could involve interpretation of Utah Rule of Evidence 702, 
which provides verbatim as follows: 
412305 1 2 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702. 
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 3, 1995, Leslie Alder and Jackie Jones filed a Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District for the State of Utah. (R. 1.) In the Complaint, Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder allege that while they were employed by LDS Hospital as radiographic 
technologists, they worked with a Curix Compact, which was sold by Bayer Corporation, 
Agfa Division (now known as Agfa Corporation) ("AGFA"), to process mammography 
films. (R. 2.) They allege that following the relocation of the Curix Compact to a room 
designed to perform mammographies (the "Mammography Suite"), they "began 
experiencing increased symptoms associated with their exposure to the processing 
chemicals." (Id.) According to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, "it was determined that the 
room [where the Curix Compact was located] had no negative ventilation." (R. 3.) As a 
result, they claim to have been "exposed to extremely high concentrations of the 
processor chemicals and have become permanently disabled and further have developed 
heightened sensitivity to a variety of chemicals." (Id.) Further, Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder 
allege that they could not continue to work in any capacity at LDS Hospital because of 
their heightened sensitivity to various chemicals. (Id.) 
Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder allege that AGFA had a duty to determine whether the 
building ventilation in LDS Hospital's Mammography Suite was functioning properly 
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and that AGFA breached this duty. (R. 4.) They further allege that AGFA was negligent 
in its attempt to correct the building ventilation problem by installing a diversion unit on 
the Curix Compact. (Id.) 
On March 3, 1997, Appellants filed an Amended Complaint (the "Amended 
Complaint") in which they revised their theories of liability to assert product liability 
claims against AGFA, (R. 249.) 
On June 23, 1999, AGFA moved for summary judgment to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint based upon the two-year statute of limitations in Utah's Products Liability Act 
(the "Act"). (R. 2336.) The District Court granted AGFA'S motion in part and held that 
Appellants' product liability claims were time-barred. (R. 1197—copy attached at 
Addendum A.) The District Court also determined, however, that the Act did not apply 
to Appellants' negligence claims and denied AGFA'S motion to the extent that it sought 
dismissal of the negligence claims. (Id.) 
On September 7, 1999, AGFA filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order with the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 1219.) On October 25, 1999, the 
Supreme Court of Utah entered an Order denying the Petition. (R. 1234.) 
After this ruling, AGFA moved for summary judgment to dismiss the remaining 
negligence claims. (R 1294.) AGFA argued below that Appellants could not meet their 
burden of proof on any of the essential elements of their negligence claims because the 
expert testimony proffered to meet the elements failed to meet the requirements of 
reliability and fit under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 
(Utah 1989), and was therefore inadmissible. (R. 1295.) AGFA argued that Ms. Jones 
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and Ms. Alder could not establish that their alleged MCS condition is a legitimate disease 
entity, based on any accepted or reliable medical test or diagnostic criteria. (Id.) AGFA 
also argued that the undisputed evidence is that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were not 
exposed to chemicals at any level known to cause harm, and that they could not prove as 
a matter of law that their alleged MCS was caused by exposure to chemicals emitted from 
the Curix Processor. (Id.) Finally, AGFA also argued that it had no duty with respect to 
the condition of the ventilation system at LDS Hospital, and that Ms. Jones and Ms. 
Alder had not articulated a legally cognizable duty on AGFA'S part to install, operate or 
otherwise ensure that the Hospital's ventilation system was working properly. (Id.) 
Without proof of the existence of such a duty, and in view of the fact that Appellants' 
product liability claims were dismissed as untimely, AGFA was entitled to summary 
judgment. (Id.) 
On October 4, 2000, the District Court entered an Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, granting AGFA'S motion on each ground raised by AGFA. (R. 
2366—copy attached at Addendum B.) Noting that an essential element of proof is 
damage, the Court held that "plaintiffs evidence and testimony offered in support of 
MCS is not admissible [because it] was not based upon inherently reliable scientific or 
medical foundation as required under Rimmasch and Utah Rule of Evidence 702." (R. 
2368.) The District Court also held that Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof 
on causation because they "are unable to prove exposure to any chemicals, let alone 
levels know to cause toxic effects." (R. 2367). Finally, the District Court found that 
"Appellants fail[ed] to prove that defendants had a duty to control the operation or 
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installation of the ventilation system [or] persuade [the] Court that any legally cognizable 
duty, sufficient to support a claim of negligence, exists between the plaintiffs and 
defendant." (Id.) 
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS 
AGFA offers the following Counter-Statement of Facts because Appellants' 
"Statement of Facts" contains material inaccuracies, mischaracterizations, and statements 
that are not supported by the record. 
In 1988, LDS Hospital purchased a Curix Compact from AGFA for use in 
processing mammography films. (R. 251.) LDS Hospital purchased the fixer and 
developer chemistry for use in the Curix Compact from Kodak. (R. 1391.) Kodak is not 
a party to this case. LDS Hospital's chief technologist, William Patrick Bendall, testified 
that Kodak supplied LDS Hospital with Material Safety Data Sheets ("MSDS") (R. 1393) 
to LDS Hospital, which contain toxicity and safe handling information regarding the x-
ray developer and fixer chemistry. (R. 1410, 1470-71.) 
Appellants Leslie Alder and Jackie Jones were both employed by LDS Hospital as 
radiographic technologists. (R. 250.) When they first began their employment with LDS 
Hospital, both Appellants rotated among several different departments, taking and 
developing x-rays. (R. 1410, 1470-71.) 
Sometime prior to February or March 1993, some five years after AGFA'S sale of 
the Curix Compact, LDS Hospital was remodeling a major portion of the second floor, 
and it decided to move the mammography department to the second floor into an area 
(the Mammography Suite) that would be remodeled specifically for mammographies. (R. 
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1422.) While constructing the Mammography Suite, LDS Hospital did not rely upon 
AGFA to ensure that the new ventilation system was adequate. (Id.) 
LDS Hospital provided the contractor constructing the Mammography Suite with 
specific instructions that there must be ten air exchanges per hour in the room where the 
Cui*ix Compact was to be located. (Id.) LDS Hospital determined that ten air exchanges 
per hour were necessary by referring to a manual for the Curix Compact that had been 
provided by AGFA. (Id.) In addition to advising the contractor that ten air exchanges 
per hour were required, an LDS Hospital representative requested that the contractor 
install an external vent with negative pressure in the processing room where the Curix 
Compact would be located to minimize the presence of vapors. (R. 1423.) 
After construction had begun, but before the move to the Mammography Suite 
was completed, Tim Murray, AGFA'S service representative, again gave LDS Hospital 
the AGFA specifications, which state that ten air exchanges per hour are recommended 
for ventilation of x-ray processing rooms. (R. 1422.) Sometime after the move to the 
Mammography Suite, Tim Murray asked Pat Bendall if the ventilation had been tested 
and was told that LDS Hospital's maintenance department had checked the room and the 
ventilation was adequate. (Id.) 
Ms. Jones claims that she developed chest tightness within three or four months 
after the move to the Mammography Suite and complained about these problems to Mr. 
Bendall. (R. 1411-14.) Appellants also claim that during the course of work in the 
Mammography Suite they developed a host of physical symptoms including: 
"[hjeadaches, shortness of breath, chest pain, loss of voice, running nose, nausea, 
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vomiting, lightheadedness, constriction of throat, extreme fatigue, painful joints, burning 
and itching skin and eyes, chemical taste in mouth, sinus pressure, earaches, 
tremors/shaking, delayed healing of sores and cuts, achy muscles, ringing in the ears, 
popping and cracking of joints, abnormal pap smears and fibromyalgia symptoms." (R. 
1431-32, 1440-41.) 
In response to the complaints made by Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder, LDS Hospital 
ultimately tested the ventilation in the Mammography Suite and discovered that the 
building ventilation was not working properly. Subsequently, LDS Hospital corrected 
the ventilation system. (R. 1447-48.) After LDS Hospital corrected the building 
ventilation, air samples were taken in the Mammography Suite and no airborne chemicals 
were detected. (R. 1407.) Appellants argue that OSHA determined that there were only 
two air exchanges in the Mammography Suite before the Hospital fixed the ventilation 
(Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants ("Appellants' Brief) at 6), but cite no evidence 
to support this contention. 
AGFA did not participate in any way with LDS Hospital's installation, testing or 
modification of the ventilation system. (R. 1423.) However, AGFA did install a 
collector and a vent hose on the Curix Compact in March 1995. (R. 1452.) 
Despite the improvements by the Hospital to the ventilation in the Mammography 
Suite, in or about May 1995, both Appellants left LDS Hospital, stating that they could 
not continue to work in any capacity at the Hospital. (R. 1368-72.) According to 
Appellants, both had developed a hypersensitivity to all chemicals and could no longer be 
exposed to the many chemicals allegedly found in a hospital environment. (Id.) 
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Despite numerous diagnostic tests performed by multiple medical providers, there 
is no objective evidence that Appellants are sensitive to any chemicals, other than allergy 
tests that indicate that Ms. Alder is allergic to latex. (R. 1458, 1464.) Neither Appellant 
suffers from immunologic disease. (R. 1457, 1519.) Ms. Jones suffers from no 
respiratory impairment. (R. 1457.) Ms. Alder suffers from no permanent respiratory 
impairment. (R. 1519.) 
Nonetheless, Appellants' experts have diagnosed their self-reported 
hypersensitivity to chemicals as Multiple Chemical Sensitivities ("MCS") or "immune 
toxicity." (R. 1456, 1534, 1538, 1541-42, 1562-63, 1577-78, 1583, 1590.) According to 
Appellants' expert Dr. Mark Cullen, who originally coined the term MCS, the 
manifestations of MCS are: (1) a demonstrable environmental exposure, which causes a 
symptomatic response in an individual; (2) the recurrence or persistence of these 
symptoms at lower doses of chemicals; and (3) the development of more symptoms to 
different chemicals; (4) which cause complaints involving more organ systems. (R. 
1595, 1607-08.) 
Although Appellants' expert Dr. Michael Gray has diagnosed Appellants with 
"immune toxicity," the crux of his opinion is that they suffer from a hypersensitivity to a 
wide spectrum of chemicals as a result of low-level exposure to some chemicals, the 
same symptom complex that has been called MCS by others. (R. 1465.) In fact, Dr. 
Gray says he does not use MCS as a diagnostic term because of the "legal implications" 
of using that term. (R. 1626.) He also states that patients colloquially refer to themselves 
as suffering from MCS, and that these people "are most often found to have conditions 
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that reflect immune toxic states." (R. 1628-32.) Indeed, Dr. Gray also states that the lay 
public generally refers to immune toxicity by many different names, including MCS. (R. 
1530.) 
In reaching their diagnosis of Appellants as suffering from MCS or "immune 
toxicity," Appellants' experts relied on the subjective complaints of the Appellants, 
because there are no diagnostic techniques or biological markers to verify a diagnosis of 
MCS. (R. 1595-96, 1605-06, 1639-40, 1534-35, 1547, 1556, 1582-83, 1591-92.) Yet 
these experts did not separately validate or confirm that Appellants were in fact exposed 
to x-ray processing chemicals, but instead relied upon Appellants' self-reporting (which 
was not based on scientific data or analysis). (R. 1636-38, 1549, 1568-69, 1589-90.) 
None of Appellants' experts can identify a known cause of MCS. (R. 1599-1600, 
1539, 1565, 1531-32, 1534.) The following testimony from Dr. Cullen is illustrative: 
Q. Do we know what specific chemicals cause MCS 
symptoms? 
A. No. In fact, not only do we not know it in that form, 
what we know to be true is that an incredibly diverse 
array of odors, irritants and intoxicants may precipitate 
what appears to be virtually the identical clinical 
patterns. So that I think everything we know suggests 
that some unique chemical attribute is not at play. 
(R. 1617-18.) Indeed, according to Dr. Cullen, "distinguishing which chemical quote 
caused unquote the MCS is extraordinarily—it's impossible and of no value." (R. 1619.) 
Appellants' experts concede that MCS is not considered a valid diagnosis and is 
not generally accepted in the scientific community. (R. 1624-25, 1627, 1635, 1554). 
Appellants' expert Dr. Cullen referred to MCS as "infant science." (R.1602.) Even 
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among MCS proponents, there is no single accepted diagnostic definition of MCS. (R. 
1696.) 
Despite the utter lack of proof that MCS is a valid medical diagnosis, Appellants' 
toxicologist/entomologist, Richard Lipsey, Ph.D., proposed to testify that Appellants 
developed MCS as a result of exposure to unspecified levels of x-ray processing 
chemicals. (R. 1379-80.) According to Dr. Lipsey, the best way to perform an exposure 
assessment is to conduct air sampling, using a worst-case scenario approach. (R. 1658.) 
However, Dr. Lipsey did not do any air sampling at LDS Hospital to arrive at his 
opinions, because Appellants did not ask him to do so. (Id.) Instead, Dr. Lipsey has 
assumed exposure based on the theory that Appellants' symptoms are consistent with 
exposure. (R. 1655-56.) Similarly, Dr. Lipsey makes the circular conclusion that it is 
unnecessary to know the dose of each chemical to which Appellants were exposed, 
because their symptomology purportedly demonstrates that they were necessarily 
exposed to chemicals in sufficient dose to cause injury. (R. 1651-52.) 
In contrast, AGFA'S expert, John Spencer, CIH, CSP, conducted actual air 
sampling at LDS Hospital's Mammography Suite on December 7, 1999. (R. 1663.) 
Based upon his review of Kodak's MSDS for the fixer and developer used in the Curix 
Compact, Mr. Spencer included the following chemicals in his air sampling analysis: 
hydroquinone, acetic acid, ammonia and sulfur dioxide. (R. 1665.) In view of 
Appellants' specific allegations that they were exposed to glutaraldehyde, this chemical 
was also included in Mr. Spencer's analysis, despite the fact that glutaraldehyde is not 
listed by Kodak as one of the chemical constituents of its processing mixture. (Id.) 
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The air samples were collected in the Mammography Suite under worst-case 
exposure conditions. The building ventilation (air supply and return vents) was blocked 
off, along with all external exhaust lines. (R. 1666.) These samples were taken and 
analyzed in accordance with National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
("NIOSH") methods. (Id.) Results of the air sampling indicate that levels of 
glutaraldehyde, hydroquinone, ammonia and acetic acid were below the limits of 
detection. (Id.) Sulfur dioxide was found at concentrations of 0.019 to 0.064 parts per 
million ("ppm"), well below the OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit ("PEL") of 5 ppm 
over an 8-hour workday. (R. 1666-67.) 
These worst-case scenario air sampling results, the accuracy of which have not 
been contested, negate Appellants' hypothesis that they were exposed to x-ray processing 
chemicals at levels that may cause harm. In fact, any potential exposure would have been 
well below current PELs set by OSHA, as well as the Threshold Limit Values ("TLVs") 
established by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
("ACGIH"). PELs and TLVs are derived from well-controlled epidemiological and 
animal studies and set the generally accepted parameters of safe exposure. (R. 1664, 
1667.) The results of Mr. Spencer's sampling are consistent with the sampling performed 
in the Mammography Suite by LDS Hospital after the building ventilation was 
remodeled, which did not detect the presence of airborne chemicals. (R. 1405-06.) 
In light of the lack of evidence of exposure to x-ray processing chemicals even 
under a worst-case scenario, Appellants' theory of causation is an unproven hypothesis 
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based upon utter speculation. The following testimony from Appellants' expert Dr. 
Cullen makes the point succinctly: 
Q. Is it correct to say, in terms of a standard of medical or 
scientific probability, if you will, that we do not have 
sufficient information of either glutaraldehyde or 
hydroquinone exposure in these two plaintiffs? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Is it also true, therefore, that we cannot conclude to a 
reasonable degree of medical or scientific probability 
that glutaraldehyde or hydroquinone molecules caused 
their MCS? 
A. Per se, those two specific things, yes. I think our 
knowledge of that is inadequate to draw that degree of 
a causal link, yes. 
(R. 1522-23.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT #1: Appellants did not and cannot establish through reliable scientific 
techniques or principles that "Multiple Chemical Sensitivity" ("MCS") is a real disease 
entity, and that their constellation of symptoms equate with MCS. Appellants' own 
experts concede that there are no accepted diagnostic criteria for, and no known cause of, 
MCS. The lack of credible medical support for this diagnosis has led numerous medical 
organizations, including the American Medical Association, to reject MCS as a valid 
disease entity. Similarly, all the numerous courts that have addressed the issue have 
excluded expert testimony on MCS because it fails the test of reliability under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), or under various state equivalents of the Federal Rule. Thus, Appellants cannot 
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prove that they were damaged. The District Court properly excluded Appellants' 
proffered expert testimony in support of MCS, and Appellants have not demonstrated that 
the District Court abused its discretion in doing so. In light of the District Court's 
evidentiary ruling, summary judgment in favor of AGFA is proper. 
ARGUMENT #2: Appellants did not and cannot prove that their alleged MCS was 
caused by exposure to x-ray processing chemicals at LDS Hospital. Appellants lack any 
evidence that chemicals used in AGFA'S Curix Compact can cause MCS at any exposure 
level, or that Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones contracted MCS as a proximate result of exposure 
to chemicals at levels sufficient to cause the alleged harm. Appellants' exclusive reliance 
on the post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning of their testifying experts is insufficient as a 
matter of law to prove causation. In view of the undisputed evidence that MCS is not 
associated with exposure to x-ray processing chemicals (or to any other chemical 
exposure) and the uncontradicted data that Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were not exposed to 
any chemicals at levels known to cause harm, the District Court correctly ruled that Ms. 
Alder and Ms. Jones cannot prove medical causation as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT #3: Appellants cannot establish the existence of any legally cognizable 
duty that AGFA owed to Appellants with respect to the condition of the ventilation 
system at LDS Hospital. Appellants maintain that the Hospital's ventilation in the 
Mammography Suite was below the levels AGFA recommended to LDS Hospital (ten air 
exchanges per hour), and yet seek to impose liability on AGFA for this condition, despite 
the undisputed fact that AGFA did not design, install, test or maintain the ventilation 
system. AGFA'S sale of the Curix Compact to LDS Hospital does not as a matter of law 
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give rise to a common law duty to inspect or test the Hospital's ventilation system many 
years after the sale of the Curix Compact and following structural renovations of the 
Hospital's Mammography Suite. To the contrary, AGFA, as seller of the Curix Compact, 
is entitled to assume that its recommended actions would be read and heeded by LDS 
Hospital. There is simply no basis in law or reason for imposing such an unprecedented 
duty on a product manufacturer such as AGFA. Therefore, the District Court properly 
entered summary judgment in favor of AGFA. 
ARGUMENT #4: An Appellate Court may affirm a District Court's summary 
judgment ruling on any grounds appearing in the record, whether relied upon by the 
District Court or not. Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 386. Here, this Court should affirm the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AGFA on the alternative ground 
(raised below by AGFA on its motion for summary judgment on the statute of 
limitations) that each of the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint is a product 
liability claim that is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah's 
Product Liability Act. The Product Liability Act applies to all claims alleging a product 
defect and should be interpreted to apply to such claims even when they are artfully pled 
as negligence claims or otherwise. Appellants have not challenged the District Court's 
finding that Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones were aware of their injury and the alleged cause of 
their injury more than two years before filing the Complaint. Therefore, the application 
of the Product Liability Act to the facts of this case is a strictly legal issue, which can and 
should be resolved in favor of AGFA, and for the benefit of other litigants called upon to 
defend claims that are deemed stale by the Product Liability Act. 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT 
h THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING THE SPECULATIVE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY 
FROM PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS THAT MS. JONES AND MS. ALDER 
HAVE "MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY/' PLAINTIFFS FAILED 
TO PROVE A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE INJURY. 
Relying upon the standard for admissibility of expert opinions under State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989) and Utah Rule of Evidence 702, the District 
Court correctly ruled that the Appellants' proffered expert testimony on Multiple 
Chemical Sensitivity ("MCS") was inadmissible because it was not based upon reliable 
scientific or medical methodology. (R. 2368.) The District Court's exclusion of 
plaintiffs' expert testimony was a sound exercise of its discretion, and was fully 
consistent with the treatment of this controversial diagnosis by other courts throughout 
the country and every major medical association that has formally addressed the issue. In 
short, there is simply no scientific basis for an MCS diagnosis, and there is surely no 
scientific or medical support for the proposition that chemicals in general, or x-ray 
processing chemicals in particular, can cause this highly subjective constellation of 
symptoms. While invoking the language of "differential diagnosis" to falsely validate 
their speculative and novel MCS hypothesis, Appellants' testifying experts still admit that 
they have discovered nothing new to contradict the overwhelming body of medical 
evidence that rejects the premise of Appellants' damage claim. Specifically, it is 
undisputed, and unchallenged on this appeal, that there is no accepted diagnostic criteria 
for, and no known cause of, MCS. The District Court properly exercised its gatekeeping 
responsibility and its broad discretion over the admissibility of expert testimony by 
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refusing to allow Appellants' experts to speculate, with no scientific reasoning or 
evidence to substantiate their ipse dixit opinion, that Ms. Jones's and Ms. Alder's 
subjective complaints equate with MCS. 
A. The District Court Properly Excluded the Proffered Expert Testimony 
that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder Suffer from MCS, Because the 
Testimony Was Not Supported by Reliable Scientific Principles or 
Techniques. 
The admission of expert testimony is governed by Utah Rule of Evidence 702, 
which provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
In Rimmasch, 115 P.2d at 396, the Utah Supreme Court instructed trial courts to 
act as gatekeepers and carefully scrutinize proffered expert testimony before admitting 
such testimony into evidence. Under Rimmasch, a trial court must apply a three-part test, 
and it is the party offering the expert testimony that bears the burden of establishing each 
element. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 341 (Utah 1997). First, the Court must determine 
whether the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are 
inherently reliable. Id.; State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996). The Court may 
do sp by judicial notice "if the scientific principles and techniques at issue have been 
generally recognized and accepted by the legal and scientific communities." Crosby, 927 
P.2d at 641. If judicial notice is not appropriate, however, the party seeking to introduce 
the expert testimony must "request that the trial court determine that these principles or 
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techniques are inherently reliable after an evidentiary hearing addressing the issue." 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398. Appellants did not request an evidentiary hearing on this 
issue. Second, if the testimony is found to be inherently reliable, the trial court must 
next determine whether the scientific principles or techniques have been properly applied 
to the facts of the particular case by sufficiently qualified experts. Third, if the first two 
prongs are satisfied, the court must assess whether the proffered scientific evidence will 
be more probative than prejudicial, as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 403. See 
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641; Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398, n.7-8, 400.1 Here, the District 
Court correctly found that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder had failed to satisfy the first prong 
(reliability) of the Rimmasch test. Accordingly, it was unnecessary for the District Court 
to address the second and third prongs of the test (fit2 and probative value3). 
1
 Following Rimmasch, the United States Supreme Court set forth its standard for 
admissibility of expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993). The Utah Supreme Court has refused to adopt Daubert, which it 
perceives as a more flexible and liberal standard. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640 (quoting 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 397). As the Crosby Court held, unlike Daubert, "Rimmasch 
provides a detailed and rigorous outline for trial courts to follow when making 
determinations concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence," and the Rimmasch 
standard continues to govern admissibility in Utah courts. 927 P.2d at 642. 
2
 Fundamentally, Appellants' experts concede that there is no accepted procedure 
or objective testing that can be utilized to determine and confirm the existence of MCS. 
They further concede that there are no generally accepted diagnostic criteria for placing a 
patient into the category of MCS. Thus, it follows logically and inexorably that there can 
be no showing under the "fit" prong that an established scientific methodology was 
applied properly to the facts of this case, because no such methodology exists. 
3
 Appellants' MCS theory also fails the last prong of the Rimmasch test, which 
requires the trial court to balance the probative weight of the testimony against the 
prejudice that could result. Here, even if admissible under the first two prongs of the 
Rimmasch test, the proffered expert testimony on MCS is highly dubious and entitled to 
little weight. On the other hand, such testimony is highly prejudicial because jurors may 
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The record is clear that Appellants utterly failed to meet their burden to 
demonstrate the "inherent reliability" of the principles and techniques underlying their 
experts' theory that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder have contracted MCS. Because they 
acknowledged that there is no accepted diagnostic criteria or objective testing to confirm 
an MCS diagnosis (R. 1595-96, 1605-06, 1639-40, 1534-35, 1547, 1556, 1582-83, 1591-
92), Appellants' experts can offer no proof that their MCS diagnosis is based upon 
"reliable" principles and techniques. Their unscientific pronouncement that Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder now suffer from this purported disease is inherently unprovable and 
untestable. Further, their essential premise that MCS is a real disease has been 
overwhelmingly rejected by the relevant medical and scientific communities. (R. 1465.) 
Among the prestigious medical societies and organizations that have rejected the MCS 
hypothesis are the American Medical Association, the American College of Physicians, 
the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology, the American College of 
Occupational Medicine, the California Medical Association, the Ministry of Health of the 
Province of Ontario, the General Medical Council of Great Britain and the International 
Society of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. (R. 1466.) Numerous peer-
reviewed journals addressing the MCS theory have also rejected it. (R. 1467.) None of 
Appellants' experts applied, or even articulated, a reliable technique or principle to reject 
the view of these authoritative medical institutions that MCS simply does not exist as a 
place undue weight on testimony from an "expert" regardless of the theory's lack of 
reliability or fit. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah 1997) (risks of 
admitting expert's testimony exceeded testimony's probative value where expert's 
simulation bore only limited resemblance to facts of case). Therefore, Appellant cannot 
satisfy any of the three prongs of the Rimmasch criteria. 
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real disease. The District Court correctly reached the inescapable conclusion that 
plaintiffs did not and could not meet their burden to prove "inherent reliability," and 
therefore properly excluded the proposed expert testimony. 
B. The District Court Correctly Applied the Rimmasch Standard of 
Admissibility. 
Appellants misconstrue the basis for the District Court's evidentiary ruling in 
arguing that the Court limited its inquiry to the reliability of the proposed experts' 
"opinions and conclusions," rather than their "methods and techniques." (Appellants' 
Brief at 32.) Nothing in the record below or in the District Court's opinion supports this 
limited view of the District Court's rulings. Specifically, the District Court ruled that the 
evidence offered by Appellants was not based on "reliable scientific or medical 
foundation as required under Rimmasch and Utah Rule of Evidence 702." (R. 2368.) The 
fact that the District Court correctly applied Rimmasch and focused on the "methods and 
techniques" underlying the challenged expert testimony is confirmed by the District 
Court's express recognition of the holdings in other MCS cases in which similar 
testimony was excluded "for lack of sound scientific reasoning and methodology." (R. 
2367.) Further, the lack of sound scientific methods and techniques supporting the 
Appellants' MCS claim was the focus of AGFA'S challenge under Rimmasch. AGFA 
established without contradiction that scientists and judges have rejected MCS because 
the existence of MCS as a disease category has never been adequately demonstrated 
through tests, and a physician must rely solely on a patient's subjective description of his 
or her symptoms in relation to various environmental exposures. See, e.g., Zwillinger v. 
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Garfield Slope Housing Corp., 1998 WL 623589 at *10 (E.D.N.Y.);4 see Greenspan v. 
Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1120 (1995); Sterling v. 
Vesicol Chem. Corp, 855 F.2d 1188, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988). Yet the "symptoms" of MCS 
are legion and can be as simple as the urge to sneeze. (R. 1465-66, H17.) Similarly, the 
chemicals that are said to cause MCS cannot be limited to any recognizable class of 
chemicals. (R. 1466, Hi8.) Thus, MCS violates a fundamental rule of medicine: that a 
disease must have a definition in relation to cause and effect. (R. 1467, H19.) 
In addition, MCS patients have no biochemical abnormalities that can be tested 
directly or indirectly by any diagnostic tool, including hematological, biochemical, 
physiological and immunological tests. Zwillinger, supra, at *15-16, *18. See 
Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 239; Frank v. State of New York, 972 F. Supp. 130, 136-37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Carlin v. RFEIndus. Inc., 1995 WL 760739 at *4 (N.D.N.Y.). Nor can 
toxicological testing techniques confirm the existence of MCS. Zwillinger, supra, at *19. 
See Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237; Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1209. Nonetheless, MCS adherents 
posit that a patient can exhibit symptoms as a result of doses that are so small that they 
are thought by mainstream scientists to be incapable of producing illness or symptoms. 
Zwillinger, supra, at *19. 
In fact, MCS proponents cannot identify the mechanism whereby exposure to 
chemicals can result in MCS. Zwillinger, supra, at *16. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1208. 
While there are numerous theories as to the biological mechanism causing MCS, none 
4
 In the Zwillinger case, the Court excluded the testimony of Dr. Michael Gray, 
one of Appellants' proffered experts. 
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has gained acceptance, even among adherents of MCS, and there are no peer-reviewed 
epidemiological data or animal studies that confirm the existence of MCS, let alone its 
cause. Zwillinger, supra, at *15. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1208; Sanderson v. 
International Flavors and Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981, 994 (CD. Cal. 1996). 
For reasons similar to those articulated by the District Court, MCS has been 
rejected by Courts throughout the country, even when applying the more flexible federal 
standard under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
See, e.g., Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1994) (MCS hypothetical and of 
no assistance to the trier of fact); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d at 238 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(diagnosis of ecological illness and multiple allergies not generally accepted); Donato v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1994) (hypersensitivity to chemicals 
based on clinical ecology not recognized by medical organizations and not accepted 
ground for disability); Brown v. Shalala, 15 F.3d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding 
substantial evidence that environmental illness was not based upon medically accepted 
techniques); Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1208-09 (experts' opinions on immune system 
impairment not widely accepted and inadmissible); Coffey v. County of Hennepin, 23 F. 
Supp.2d 1081, 1086 (D. Minn. 1998) (MCS not scientific knowledge and expert 
testimony on MCS inadmissible); Coffin v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 20 F. Supp.2d 107, 
111 (D. Maine 1998) (MCS has not progressed to scientific knowledge and cannot assist 
trier of fact); Treadwell v. Dow-United Technologies, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 974, 984 (M.D. 
Ala. 1997) (MCS etiology and clinical ecology not reliable); Frank, 972 F. Supp. at 136-
37) (MCS too speculative to meet requirements of scientific knowledge); Sanderson, 950 
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F. Supp. at 1001-02) (given present state of knowledge, MCS remains scientific 
controversy and does not represent reliable scientific knowledge which Daubert and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 require); Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. System, 897 F. 
Supp. 533, 538 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (MCS hypothesis has not progressed to point where it 
could assist trier of fact), affd, 132 F.3d 39 (10th Cir. 1997); Collins v. Welch, 178 Misc. 
2d 107, 109 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1998) (granting motion to exclude expert 
testimony on MCS); Zwillinger, 1998 WL 623589 (rejecting testimony on MCS because 
the diagnosis is too speculative to qualify as scientific knowledge under Daubert); 
Carlin, 1995 WL 760739 (expressing serious doubt that there is any scientific validity to 
MCS).5 Given the complete rejection of MCS in the relevant scientific and legal 
communities, and in the absence of any reliable medical techniques or diagnostic criteria 
to validate their MCS hypothesis, it is clear that Appellants' medical proofs lack the 
requisite reliability required under Rimmasch. 
Despite this universal rejection of MCS as a disease entity and the scientific 
community's acknowledgement that the cause of MCS symptoms is unknown, 
Appellants propose to offer expert testimony that, they hope, would lead a jury of eight 
lay people to declare just the opposite. However, as Judge Posner aptly declared in a 
non-MCS case, "the courtroom is not the place for scientific guess work, even of the 
5
 Appellants' own experts concede that MCS is controversial and is not generally 
accepted in the scientific community. (R. 1624-25, 1627, 1635, 1554.) It is Dr. Gray's 
awareness of this fact that prompts him to avoid use of the term MCS in favor of the term 
"immune toxicity." (R. 1626.) In acknowledging the controversy surrounding MCS, Dr. 
Cullen refers to this symptom-complex as "infant science." (R. 1602.) 
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inspired sort. Law lags science; it does not lead it." Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 
316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (physician's opinion that nicotine patch caused heart attack was 
not valid scientific evidence). 
C. Because the District Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of MCS, 
Appellants' Claims Against AGFA Fail for Lack of Proof of Damage. 
It is axiomatic that a plaintiff in a negligence suit must establish, among other 
essential elements, that she has sustained a legally cognizable injury. Weber v. Springville 
City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1366 (Utah 1986). Here, Appellants' self-reported symptomology 
cannot, without a legitimate diagnosis from a qualified expert, sustain their burden of 
proof on damages. Preston & Chambers v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah 1997) (expert 
testimony required when average person has little or no understanding of issues). 
Accordingly, the District Court's exclusion of Appellants' unfounded expert testimony 
that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder have MCS must result in the entry of judgment in favor of 
AGFA. 
Implicitly acknowledging that they cannot demonstrate that the proffered expert 
testimony on MCS meets the Rimmasch requirements, Appellants argue that they are 
suffering from a host of physical symptoms in addition to MCS, including sinus 
problems, respiratory problems, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia and cognitive 
deficits and that they can therefore prove they have been damaged. (Appellants' Brief at 
32.) Appellants' argument is specious for several reasons. First, as in every MCS case, 
plaintiffs' controversial diagnosis involves disparate subjective symptoms spanning 
multiple organ systems. It is the hallmark of MCS that patients allegedly experience 
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these symptoms (sinus problems, respiratory problems, fatigue syndrome, cognitive 
deficits) when exposed to low-level exposure to chemicals that are safe to the rest of the 
population. The "disease," whether identified as MCS by some practitioners or "immune 
toxicity" by Dr. Gray, is the array of symptoms that result from such low-level exposures. 
It is illogical and unavailing, therefore, for Appellants to argue that their damage claim 
survives in the form of their isolated symptoms, even if the MCS diagnosis is unreliable 
and inadmissible. 
Second, Appellants' own experts acknowledge that the classification of Ms. Jones 
and Ms. Alder as MCS patients results from the inability of other diagnoses to fit their 
symptom profile—in particular their unexplainable hypersensitive reaction to safe levels 
of diverse chemical compounds. For example, while acknowledging a partial "overlap" 
between MCS and chronic fatigue and fibromyalgia, Appellants' expert Dr. Robinson 
explains that the basis for placing a patient into the category MCS is the "onset or 
exacerbation of their disease with a chemical exposure." (R. 2631.) Similarly, Dr. Cullen 
explains that Ms. Alder's "fibromyalgia" is actually a part of the MCS diagnosis: "[Ijt's a 
partial diagnosis. It describes some of her problem but it doesn't get all the way around 
the picture." {Id.) 
Most importantly, Appellants cannot now argue that this is something other than 
an MCS case, when their position below was precisely the opposite. In their Statement of 
Material Facts below, Appellants cited to Dr. Cullen for the proposition that fibromyalgia 
and chronic fatigue syndrome have been appropriately "ruled out in favor of MCS." (R. 
1771.) Appellants also sought to validate the MCS label by citing to Dr. Cullen's finding 
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that the central nervous system complaints (cognitive deficits) and fatigue are triggered 
by low-level environmental irritants. (R. 1772.) They also referred approvingly in their 
brief below to Dr. Cullen's finding that "the association between exposures at low level 
and the triggering of symptoms is the sine qua non of MCS." (Id.) 
In sum, the label Appellants now attempt to put on their physical ailment to* 
distance themselves from the junk science of MCS cannot affect in any way the analysis 
of its reliability and validity under Rimmasch. Zwillinger, 1998 WL 623589. Thus, the 
District Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding Appellants' proffered expert 
testimony on MCS as based upon an entirely unreliable and widely discredited 
foundation, and correctly granted summary judgment to AGFA for lack of proof of a 
legally cognizable injury. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MS- JONES AND 
MS. ALDER FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE THAT THEIR 
ALLEGED MCS WAS CAUSED BY EXPOSURE TO X-RAY 
PROCESSING CHEMICALS FROM THE CURIX COMPACT. 
To prevail on their negligence claims against AGFA, Appellants must 
affirmatively prove: (1) that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder were exposed to x-ray processing 
chemicals at a level sufficient to cause injury (general causation); and (2) that these 
chemicals were the cause in fact of such injury in this case (specific causation). See, e.g., 
Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1448 (D.V.I. 1994), 
aff'd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994). These are two separate and necessary inquiries, 
drawing upon different scientific disciplines. See In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig., 52 
F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995). Any expert testimony proffered to prove general or 
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specific causation must meet the standards of reliability set forth in State v. Rimmasch. 
Here, Appellants' arguments in opposition to AGFA'S motion for summary judgment 
were woefully insufficient as a matter of law to create a triable issue of fact as to either 
general or specific causation. See Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah 1986). 
Therefore, the Amended Complaint was correctly dismissed as a matter of law for lack of 
proof of an essential element of Appellants' negligence claim against AGFA. 
A. Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder Cannot Prove that They Were Exposed to X-
Ray Processing Chemicals at Levels Known to Cause Injury. 
The branch of science in which qualified experts determine whether a chemical 
agent can biologically cause a given illness is toxicology. Mancuso v. Consolidated 
Edison, 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Courts have consistently held that a 
toxicologist (or someone purporting to draw conclusions as to general causation) must 
properly employ the principles and methods of toxicology to prove general causation. 
Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va.), affdinpart, 100 F.3d 1150 
(4th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1044 (1996).6 
Among other central tenets, the science of toxicology posits that "the dose makes 
the poison" and all chemicals may be harmful if consumed in large quantities. Mancuso, 
967 F. Supp. at 1445; Cavallo, 892 F Supp. at 769; Sutera v. The Perrier Group of 
America, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655, 667 (D. Mass. 1997); National Bank of Commerce v. 
6
 None of the Appellants' experts are toxicologists. Although Appellants argue 
that Dr. Lipsey will opine that Appellants were exposed to x-ray processing chemicals at 
levels known to cause injury, Dr. Lipsey is qualified as an entomologist, not a 
toxicologist. Similarly, Dr. Gray was not trained as a toxicologist, although he claims to 
have experience in toxicology. Moreover, none of the treating physicians are qualified in 
toxicology. 
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Dow Chemical Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1501 (E.D. Ark. 1996), affd, 133 F.3d 1132 (8th 
Cir. 1998). Therefore, courts have held that a plaintiff claiming a chemical injury must 
prove that he was exposed to levels of chemicals known to cause toxic effects. Wright v. 
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1106-08 (8th Cir. 1996) (in order to carry burden of 
proving causation, plaintiff must demonstrate "levels of exposure that are hazardous to 
human beings generally as well as the plaintiffs level of exposure"); Allen v. 
Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[scientific knowledge of 
the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was 
exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs burden in 
a toxic tort case"); Abuan v. General Electric Co., 3 F.3d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1993), cert, 
denied, 510 U.S. 1116 (1994); Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 
1999); National Bank of Commerce, 965 F. Supp. at 1501; see also Reference Manual on 
Scientific Evidence, Chapter IV, pp. 206-9 (Federal Judicial Center 1994) (evidence of 
exposure is essential; causation cannot be established unless it is shown that the level of 
exposure was above the "no observable effect or threshold level").7 (R. 2328.) 
Appellants concede that they cannot prove exposure to chemicals above any levels 
known to cause harm and they make no attempt to do so. (Appellant's Brief at 42.) 
Rather, they argue against the great weight of legal authority that this "inability to 
7
 The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence has been widely cited for the 
proper methodology for determining causation under Daubert. See, e.g., Wright, 91 F.3d 
at 1108; In re Breast Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp.2d 1217, 1229 (D. Colo. 1998); 
Mancuso, 967 F. Supp. at 1445; National Bank of Commerce., 965 F. Supp. at 1503; 
Zwillinger., 1998 WL 623589 at * 19. 
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establish the exact levels of chemicals to which they were exposed . . . is not fatal to their 
claims." (Id. at 42-43.) However, proof of exposure is essential in any toxic tort case. 
The absence of such proof is particularly glaring here, because AGFA has affirmatively 
proven, and submitted uncontroverted evidence below, that the chemicals emitted from 
its Curix Compact processor could not have accumulated, even in a worst-case (no 
ventilation) scenario, to levels that were harmful in any way. (R. 1663.) Appellants' 
toxicology expert, Richard Lipsey, Ph.D., agreed that a valid technique to perform an 
exposure assessment was to conduct air sampling in the Mammography Suite, using a 
worst-case exposure scenario. (R. 1658.) Dr. Lipsey, however, failed to perform any 
exposure analysis (including worst-case air sampling), simply because he was not asked 
to do so. (Id.) Likewise, he has never submitted an analysis or critique of AGFA'S 
exposure assessment, which shows that even under worst-case conditions airborne 
chemistry from the Curix Compact could not have produced concentrations high enough 
to cause harm. 
In its Opening Brief on this appeal, Appellants completely ignore the findings of 
John Spencer, CIH, CSP, who conducted actual air sampling at LDS Hospital's 
Mammography Suite. (R. 1663.) His testing reveals that glutaraldehyde, hydroquinone, 
acetic acid and ammonia were well below levels that could be quantified, even when all 
ventilation was blocked, resulting in a worst-case exposure scenario. (R. 1666.) 
Moreover, sulfur dioxide was found at concentrations well below OSHA's PEL of 5 ppm 
over an 8-hour workday. (R. 1666-67.) 
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Without coming forward with any contradictory evidence, Appellants merely 
argued below that Mr. Spencer's tests are not dispositive. However, the lack of contrary 
evidence is fatal under Utah R. Civ. P. 56 because Appellants bear the burden of proof on 
the essential elements of general causation. Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 
339 (Utah 1997) (once challenged, the party opposing summary judgment must come 
forward with sufficient proof to support his or her claim); Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1391 ("the 
complete failure of proof on an essential element on the nonmoving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immateriar'). See also, Weiss v. Mechanical 
Associated Services, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 124-25 (Texas App. 1999) (in case alleging 
exposure to x-ray processing chemicals, expert's diagnosis found to be unreliable in the 
"absence of sampling data" for glutaraldehyde). 
Appellants argue that the testimony of their "treating physicians and other experts" 
establishes that their alleged exposure to x-ray processing chemicals caused them to 
develop MCS because these physicians purportedly conducted a "differential diagnosis," 
supported by an alleged temporal relationship between the alleged exposure and onset of 
injury. As discussed below, this mere lip service to scientific methodology is no 
substitute as a matter of law for reliable toxicological principles and techniques. The 
differential diagnosis is also plainly insufficient to refute Mr. Spencer's unchallenged 
findings that a worst-case exposure scenario would have been insufficient to cause harm 
to Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder. 
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B. Appellants' Experts' Purported "Differential Diagnosis" Cannot Prove 
Exposure or Medical Causation. 
Differential diagnosis is a technique used by clinicians to treat patients, and it is 
not a reliable substitute for the toxicological methods that must be employed to 
demonstrate general causation. In re Breast Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp.2d 1217, 
1230 (D.Colo. 1998). Differential diagnosis, as used in the medical profession, is a 
clinical process whereby doctors determine from what disease a patient suffers.8 By 
comparing the patient's symptoms to symptoms associated with known diseases, the 
physician attempts to identify the disease or diseases that best explain the facts of the 
patient's case. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F.Supp. 12, 21, n.41 (D.Mass. 1995). 
Identification takes place through a process of elimination, with the physician applying 
diagnostic tests and collecting data to systematically "rule out" possible diseases, until a 
final diagnosis is reached, permitting appropriate medication and treatment. See In re 
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F.Supp.2d at 1229. Clearly, this diagnostic methodology lacks 
the requisite "fit" under Rimmasch to determine the cause of MCS generally, or the cause 
of Appellants' alleged MCS in particular. 
Indeed, in most of the cases cited by Appellants for the proposition that 
differential diagnosis alone is enough to prove causation, the courts admitted testimony 
on differential diagnosis because it found that the expert had first demonstrated general 
causation. See, e.g. Heller v. Shaw, 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (testimony of 
8
 According to Stedman's Medical Dictionary, differential diagnosis is "the 
determination of which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one from 
which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of the clinical 
findings." Stedman ys Medical Dictionary at 428 (25th ed. 1990). 
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expert performing differential diagnosis was admissible because the testimony of an 
industrial hygienist established evidence of exposure at levels sufficient to cause injury); 
Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi, 178 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (expert opinion admitted 
when "it was undisputed that inhalation of high levels of talc irritated mucous 
membranes" and "there was evidence of substantial exposure where talc settled from the 
air around [plaintiffs] work area was so thick that one could see footprints in it on the 
floor"); Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, 174 F.3d 661, 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1999) (expert 
demonstrated general causation by relying upon MSDS); Baker v. Dalkon Shield 
Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 253 (1st Cir. 1998) (expert's opinion that chlamydia is a 
common cause of PID was undisputed); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1228 
(9 Cir. 1998) (admitting expert testimony that product caused lupus where expert relied 
upon objective, verifiable evidence, including peer-reviewed publications, clinical studies 
and product studies by the defendant, showing that product could cause autoimmune 
disorders); Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997) (expert 
presented scientific literature showing the toxic effects of the pesticide and Terminix's 
application records showed how much of the pesticide had been applied); In re Paoli R.R. 
Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 777 (3rd Cir. 1994) (court found that testing results, 
epidemiological studies and animal studies sufficed to show exposure at levels known to 
cause injury without looking to testimony of medical experts employing differential 
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diagnosis). Thus, the cited case law belies Appellants' argument that a differential 
diagnosis alone suffices to prove general causation.9 
Further, Appellants must demonstrate specific as well as general causation to 
prevail on their claims. However, to show that a particular chemical caused an injury in a 
particular plaintiff (specific causation), the chemical must first be "ruled in" as a potential 
cause by conducting a general causation analysis before it can be "ruled out" by a 
differential diagnosis. Therefore, while differential diagnosis may in certain instances be 
admissible to show specific causation, if a plaintiff cannot prove "general causation" he 
cannot prove specific causation a fortiori. See Raynor v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (specific causation evidence is irrelevant in 
absence of general causation analysis); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 
1387, 1413 (D. Ore. 1996) ("[tjestimony regarding specific causation in a given patient is 
irrelevant unless general causation is established"). 
Appellants' testifying physicians violate this basic principle by concluding that 
Appellants' MCS was specifically caused by exposure to x-ray chemicals, while at the 
same time admitting that there is no known cause of MCS. (R. 1548, 1571.) Indeed, Dr. 
Cullen has stated that scientists do not know what specific chemicals cause MCS let 
alone the levels of such chemicals that would produce the alleged illness. (R. 1617-18.) 
Without evidence that exposure to x-ray processing chemicals at some level can cause 
9
 Nor can a differential diagnosis refute actual air sampling data that demonstrates 
that any alleged chemical exposures were not harmful. 
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MCS, Appellants cannot demonstrate that their alleged exposure caused them to develop 
MCS here. 
C. Purported Temporal Relationship Between Exposure and Injury Is 
Insufficient To Prove Exposure or Medical Causation. 
Numerous courts have also rejected Appellants' argument that they can avoid the 
need to conduct traditional, "meticulous and objective" toxicological analysis by simply 
inferring causation from the alleged temporal relationship between exposure and illness 
as unreliable. Moore v. Ashland Chemicals, 151 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 1998), cert 
denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999); Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 611-12 
(7th Cir. 1993); In re Breast Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp.2d at 1232, Cavallo, 892 F. 
Supp. at 773; Hannan v. Pest Control Services, Inc.t 2000 WL 1231152. *8 (Ind. App. 
Aug. 31, 2000) (R. 2230) (rejecting diagnosis of MCS without knowledge of dose). If 
temporal relationship were sufficient to prove that a chemical or drug is capable of 
causing a given disease, then in every case of a birth defect following ingestion of 
Bendectin, for example, the plaintiff would necessarily prevail, and there would be no 
reason for courts to conduct the type of evidentiary scrutiny that led to the Daubert case. 
Here, the Appellants' proffered experts have not even attempted to confirm a 
temporal relationship between their alleged exposure and illness. In particular, they did 
not consider evidence that the Appellants had exhibited many of the same physical 
symptoms before the installation of the Curix Compact in the Mammography Suite. (R. 
1595-96, 1605-06, 1639-40, 1534-35, 1547, 1556, 1582-83, 1591-92.) Thus, even if a 
temporal relationship between an exposure and an illness were an appropriate 
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methodology to prove general causation—which it is not—Appellants' cannot even 
proffer evidence that there is an alleged temporal relationship between Appellants' 
alleged exposure and the onset of symptoms. In sum, Appellants cannot satisfy their 
burden of proof on causation by invoking magic words such as "differential diagnosis" 
and "temporal relationship." Fundamentally, they cannot avoid the requirement that they 
demonstrate exposure to chemicals at levels known to cause the alleged harm. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly dismissed Appellants' claims against AGFA for 
lack of proof of causation, because "plaintiffs are unable to prove exposure to any 
chemicals, let alone levels known to cause known toxic effects." (R. 2367.) 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT AGFA OWED NO DUTY TO APPELLANTS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE CONDITION OF LDS HOSPITAL'S VENTILATION SYSTEM. 
Appellants do not contest the District Court's prior ruling that all product liability 
claims in this case are barred under the two-year Product Liability Act statute of 
limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3 (1996). (See Order dated June 23, 1999; R. 
1196—Addendum A.) Accordingly, the claims at issue on this appeal must necessarily 
be separate and distinct from any time-barred product liability claims that might 
otherwise be alleged against a product manufacturer or supplier under Utah law—i.e., 
design defect, manufacturing defect or failure to warn. House v. Armour of America, 
Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah App. 1994;, affd, 929 P.2d 340 (1996). 
In a transparent effort to avoid application of the Product Liability Act statute of 
limitations (see Section IV, infra), appellants seek to create a new duty on the part of 
AGFA to ensure the safety of workplace environments and systems over which AGFA 
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had no control or right of control. In addressing the issue of duty as a matter of law, the 
District Court correctly ruled that there was no basis upon which to impose a duty upon 
AGFA "to control the operation or installation of [the Hospital's] ventilation system." 
(R. 2367, 1196.) Appellants' attack on the District Court's duty ruling cannot withstand 
close scrutiny of the factual and legal citations set forth in their Opening Brief. 
A. Appellants Attempt To Assert Time-Barred Product Liability Claims 
and To Introduce Evidence of Product Defect Previously Excluded by 
this Court. 
In casting the widest possible net over its liability claims, Appellants have 
included two claims that are clearly time-barred and subject to the District Court's prior 
ruling excluding any evidence of "product defects" from the trial of this matter: (1) 
failure to provide "safe equipment" (Appellants' Brief, at 26), and (2) failure to warn (id. 
at 30). These claims must be rejected because the District Court held on June 23, 1999 
that Appellants' product liability claims against AGFA are time-barred. Appellants did 
not appeal this ruling. In so ruling, the District Court declared "[wje're not going to hear 
evidence at trial about defective products. It's a case about alleged negligence on the part 
of people." (Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing held on June 23, 1999 
before the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod; R. 2336 at 10.) See also id. at 1-2 ("[t]he 
plaintiff says that it's a negligence case. He says he's not going to attack the product, he 
is only going to attack installation and operation"). 
The failure to "provide safe equipment" is either a design defect or manufacturing 
defect claim, both of which require a plaintiff to produce proof that the subject equipment 
is defective. Clearly, this is a basic product liability claim. House, 886 P.2d at 547 (Utah 
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law recognizes three types of product defects: design defects, manufacturing flaws and 
inadequate warnings regarding use). Further, the "failure to warn of dangers" associated 
with the use of a product is also a claim of "product defect." Id, These claims are 
therefore time-barred based upon the Court's June 23, 1999 ruling. See also, Strickland 
v. General Motors Corp., 852 F. Supp. 956, 958-59 (D. Utah 1996) (stating that 
legislature intended that all claims against a manufacturer based on defective product 
were subject to the statute of limitations set forth in the Product Liability Act); McCollin 
v. Synthese, 50 F. Supp.2d 1119, 1122 (D. Utah 1999) (following Strickland). 
B. The Imposition upon AGFA of a Duty To Control the Operation or 
Installation of the Hospital's Ventilation System Is Unjustified by the 
Factual Record and Existing Tort Law. 
Appellants' threshold burden is to demonstrate that AGFA owed a duty to the 
Appellants to ensure that LDS Hospital complied with AGFA'S installation guidelines. 
See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co,, 663 P.2d 433, 434-45 (Utah 1983). The existence of a 
duty is a question of law for the court to decide and requires the court to assess whether 
the imposition of a duty is fair and appropriate. AMS Salt Indus, v. Magnesium Corp, of 
America, 942 P.2d 315, 319, 321 (Utah 1997). Among the factors to consider is whether 
the duty imposes an undue burden and whether the fulfillment of such a duty is feasible. 
Id. 
Appellants argue that AGFA had a duty: (1) to use reasonable care in the 
installation of the Curix Compact; (2) to provide safe equipment; (3) to ensure that the 
Curix Compact was not operated in unsafe conditions; (4) to properly respond to the 
Plaintiffs' complaints; (5) to meet its contractual obligations to LDS Hospital; and (6) to 
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warn Plaintiffs of the alleged risks of working near the Curix Compact without adequate 
ventilation. (Appellants' Brief at 24-31.) Appellants then distort the factual record to 
argue that AGFA breached these alleged duties. 
First, Appellants argue that pursuant to an alleged contract between AGFA and 
LDS Hospital, AGFA "undertook to install the Curix Processor in the Mammography 
Suite and assumed all duties attendant thereto, including the duty to see to it that there 
was adequate ventilation for the Curix machine to be safely operated." (Appellant's Brief 
at 25.) Yet Appellants have not and cannot cite in the record to any alleged contract and 
cannot identify with specificity the purported obligations imposed on AGFA pursuant to 
this alleged contract. 
Appellants also argue that LDS Hospital "relied upon the expertise of the AGFA 
people with respect to safely ventilating the workplace," thereby creating a duty on 
AGFA'S part to use reasonable care in the installation of the Curix Machine, a duty that 
"included, at a minimum, the duty to ascertain whether there was adequate ventilation for 
the safe operation of the machine in its new location." (Appellants' Brief, at 25.) Yet 
there is absolutely no evidence that LDS Hospital abrogated its responsibility to ensure 
that the Hospital's ventilation system was properly designed or installed or that the 
Hospital relied upon AGFA to test or analyze the ventilation in the processing room. (R. 
1423.) While AGFA participated in the installation of the Curix Compact in the 
Mammography Suite, it was LDS Hospital that provided the contractor constructing the 
new Mammography Suite with specific instructions that there must be ten air exchanges 
per hour in the room where the Curix Compact was to be located. (R. 1422.) LDS 
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Hospital determined that ten air exchanges per hour were necessary by referring to a 
manual for the Curix Compact that had been provided by AGFA. (Id.) Thus, LDS 
Hospital was well aware of the ventilation requirements and undertook to assure 
compliance with AGFA'S guidelines. (Id.) Similarly, LDS Hospital did not rely upon 
AGFA to test the ventilation system in the Mammography Suite. (Id.) To the contrary, it 
was Tim Murray who inquired of Hospital representatives about the ventilation and was 
told that the room had been tested and that the ventilation was adequate. (Id.) 
Despite the fact that Mr. Murray was assured that the ventilation was adequate, 
Appellants argue that AGFA knew or should have known that its machine was not safe 
for use in the Mammography Suite. According to Appellants, Murray "developed 
concerns that the ceiling vent [in the Mammography Suite] was not working" but "failed 
again to test the ventilation in the room." (Appellants' Brief at 25, fn. 6.) Appellants also 
argue that Murray was concerned that "the lack of ventilation was causing Ms. Jones' 
health problems" but still failed to test the ventilation, as he had been instructed to do by 
an AGFA product specialist, George Cervenka. (Id.) This recitation of the "facts" is not 
supported by the record. 
There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Murray thought he connected the Curix 
Compact to a vent that was not working properly. Although he was initially concerned 
that the vent in the Mammography Suite might be a cold air vent and not an exhaust vent, 
Murray specifically asked LDS Hospital for clarification. The Hospital confirmed that 
the vent was an exhaust vent, and to this day, Murray believes that the vent in the 
Mammography Suite is and always was an exhaust vent. (R. 2270-71.) Moreover, 
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Murray inquired of Hospital representatives if testing had been done and was assured that 
the ventilation had been tested and was adequate. (R. 1422.) Accordingly, there is 
absolutely no basis to infer that AGFA knew or should have known that the ventilation 
was not adequate. 
When stripped of its unsubstantiated "facts," the crux of Appellants' argument is 
that LDS Hospital's ventilation system was not properly designed or installed and the 
improper ventilation system caused an unsafe condition in the mammography suite. As 
AGFA played no role in the design or installation of the ventilation system, it cannot be 
charged with liability arising from the failure of that ventilation system. Similarly, the 
fact that Plaintiffs complained to AGFA representatives does not create a duty where 
none existed, particularly since AGFA had no control over the instrumentality allegedly 
causing Plaintiffs' injury: the ventilation system. In sum, there is no factual rationale to 
support the imposition of a duty on AGFA to ensure that the ventilation system at LDS 
Hospital was adequate. 
Just as there is no factual basis on which to impose a duty on AGFA to ensure that 
there was adequate ventilation in the Mammography Suite, there is no legal basis upon 
which to impose such a duty. Indeed, the duties that Appellants seek to impose on AGFA 
are unprecedented and unjustified. Appellants argue in essence that AGFA, a product 
seller, must ensure that its products are used properly by purchasers and product users. 
To support the imposition of such a duty on a product seller whose product is safe when 
used in accordance with its warnings and guidelines, Appellants merely point to 
inapplicable provisions of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. They cannot 
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point to one case, however, where these RESTATEMENT provisions were applied to 
impose a duty on a product seller to "make sure" that its product is operated safely. To 
the contrary, the RESTATEMENT recognizes just the opposite: "Where warning is 
givenf the seller ma\ reasonably assume that it will be ivtui and heeded] ami a product 
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective 
condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A comment j (emphasis added). 
In sum, the District Court correctly determined that there was no basis in fact or in 
law to impose a duty on AGFA "to control the operation or installation of the ventilation 
system." (R. 2367.) Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of AGFA. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT 
THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY MS. ALDER AND MS. JONES ARE TIME-
BARRED UNDER THE TWO-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SET 
FORTH IN THE PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT. 
This Court may affirm the District Court's ruling on any ground appearing in the 
record, whether relied upon by the District Court or not. Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 
928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996). Here, AGFA had initially moved before the District 
Court for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations in Utah's 
Products Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1 through -6 (1996) (the "Act"). The 
Court's ruling that the Appellants' product liability claims were time-barred should have 
also barred as a matter of law the remaining "negligence" claims in the Amended 
Complaint. Based upon the District Court's unchallenged ruling that Appellants were on 
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claims against AGFA more than two years prior to commencing suit, this Court should 
affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of AGFA on the alternative ground that 
all claims asserted by Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones are time-barred under the Act. 
In ruling on AGFA'S prior statute of limitations motion, the District Court agreed 
that the Appellants had notice of their alleged injury and its alleged cause more than two 
years before filing the Complaint. Thus, the District Court granted AGFA'S summary 
judgment motion to the extent that it dismissed the product liability claims in the 
Amended Complaint. (R. 1197.) However, the District Court also held that Appellants' 
negligence claims, if any, were not governed by the Act, and denied AGFA'S motion to 
dismiss the entirety of the Amended Complaint. {Id.) 
Although Appellants argued in opposition to AGFA'S statute of limitations motion 
that this is not a product liability case, close scrutiny of the Record and Appellants' 
Opening Brief demonstrate that Appellants' claims arise from the basic allegations that 
AGFA'S x-ray processing equipment was "unsafe" and "unreasonably dangerous" in its 
design and accompanying warnings. Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones contend on this appeal, 
and in the proceedings below, that AGFA'S Curix Compact was "not safe for use" 
(Appellants' Brief at 26) and that liability should be imposed for AGFA'S alleged failure 
to incorporate a ventilation system into the design of the machine (Id. at 27; R. 1433, 
1442) or to "modify the subject equipment so as to render it safe" (Amended Complaint, 
at 5, He) (R. 1355). Appellants further contend that the Curix Compact created an 
"unreasonable risk of harm to those that worked in" the Mammography Suite. 
(Appellants' Brief at 27.) In addition to these basic product defect contentions, 
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Appellants also argue that AGFA violated a duty to warn "regarding the risks of working 
near the Curix machine without proper ventilation" (Id. at 30), and more generally of the 
"health risks associated with working around the subject equipment" (Amended 
Complaint, at 5, Hj)(R 1355). 
Since the Act clearly applies to any claim that the Curix Compact was defectively 
designed or accompanied by insufficient warnings, the Act's remedial intent would be 
flouted if Appellants were permitted to avoid the statutory scheme through the simple 
expedient of alleging that AGFA "fail[ed] adequately to address the workplace 
ventilation needs of Appellants;" or "fail[ed] to modify the equipment so as to render it 
safe;" or "allow[ed] the subject equipment" to be operated in a defective condition; or 
"fail[ed] adequately to respond to Appellants' complaints." These various creative 
allegations derive directly from Appellants' traditional product defect claims, and would 
normally be asserted as garden-variety product liability causes of action. They are 
asserted here as negligence for one transparent reason: to avoid application of the two-
year statute of limitation in the Act. 
In sum, despite Appellants' attempts to disguise their claims, each alleged breach 
of duty relates directly to the Curix Compact and an alleged design defect or failure to 
warn in connection with chemical vapors emitted from the Curix Compact. As such, the 
claims are governed by the Act and must be brought within two years of the Appellants' 
discovery of their injuries and the cause of those injuries. Accordingly, the District 
Court's dismissal of Appellants' claims against AGFA should be affirmed on the 
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additional ground that all claims asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred by the 
two-year statute of limitations set forth in the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, AGFA respectfully submits that this Court should 
affirm the decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to AGFA and 
dismissing the Amended Complaint. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the speculative and 
unreliable testimony from Appellants' experts that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder have 
"multiple chemical sensitivity." The District Court properly exercised its gatekeeping 
responsibility under Rimmasch. Appellants failed to prove a legally cognizable injury. 
The District Court also correctly ruled that Ms. Jones and Ms. Alder failed to prove that 
their alleged MCS was caused by exposure to x-ray processing chemicals from the Curix 
Compact. In addition, the District Court correctly ruled that AGFA owed no duty to 
Appellants with respect to the condition of LDS Hospital's ventilation system. The 
District Court's grant of summary judgment can also be affirmed on the alternative 
ground that the claims asserted Appellants are time-barred under the two-year statute of 
limitations applicable to the Product Liability Act. 
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v. DATED this 72? day of June, 2001. 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
DAVID M. BENNION 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
and 
STEPHEN G. TRAFLET 
TRAFLET, FABIAN & SHEA LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
Bayer Corporation and AGFA 
Corporation 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILES $?§?!?£! S98BT 
Thira Ji;cXciai District 
AND FOR 
LESLIE ALDER, nka LESLIE 
ROBERTS, and JACKIE JONES, 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
BAYER CORPORATION, AGFA 
DIVISION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
ESTABLISHING THAT THIS IS A 
NEGLIGENCE CASE ONLY, AND 
SETTING DISCOVERY AND OTHER 
DATES 
Case No. 95-090-7675 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the 
Court (the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod) on June 23, 1999. 
Peter C. Collins and Jacquelynn Carmichael represented 
plaintiffs. Elizabeth S. Conley and Stephen G. Traflet 
represented defendant. 
Having considered that Motion and the pertinent memoranda 
and other papers on file, having heard and considered the 
representations and arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, the Court hereby DENIES defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment to the extent that the Motion seeks 
dismissal of claims for negligence. 
L .* J \ 
The Court also ORDERS, pursuant to plaintiffs' counsel's 
acknowledgment that no claim of "product defect" or strict 
liability is being asserted in this action, and by reason of 
the fact that such claims would be barred by the relevant 
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3, 
that this case will deal, with respect to plaintiffs' theories 
of recovery, only with principles of negligence, including but 
not limited to those having to do with "products," and that 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-15-1, et seg. , does not apply to this case. 
The Court further ORDERS (plaintiffs having already 
designated retained experts and treating health care providers 
whom plaintiffs plan to call as expert witnesses at trial) that 
defendant shall designate expert witnesses whom defendant plan 
to call at trial no later than August 27, 1999; that all 
discovery shall be concluded by November 30, 1999; and that any 
and all dispositive motions shall be filed by or before 
December 15, 1999. 
ENTERED this ttf day of /tilf+j VT 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
•<^ccr^ y 
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Setting Discovery and Other Dates by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
William J. Stilling 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, #1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Steven G. Traflet 
TRAFLET & FABIAN 
Carriage Court Two 
264 South Street 
Morristown, NJ 07960 
JL 
X. 
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(536-6111) 
HAND DELIVERY 
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T ^W«TWCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT/ 2000 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPAR1 
LESLIE ALDER and JACKIE JONES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MILES, INC., a corporation, AGFA 
CORPORATION, a corporation, and BAYER 
CORPORATION, a corporation 
Defendants. 
r-ff Dapuly Clftrtc 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 950907675 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
On September 26, 2000 defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the above 
entitled Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Defendants were represented by 
Gordon Roberts, David Bennion and Stephen Traflet and plaintiffs were represented by Peter Collins 
and Jackie Carmichael. Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
In Utah, a plaintiff must establish four elements to state a claim of negligence: " (1) a duty 
of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation, 
both actually and proximately, of the injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff." 
Weber v Springville City, 725 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1986). Consequently, summary judgment is 
appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, because 
the complete failure of proof on an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial." Schafir v Harrigan 879 P.2d 1384 (1994)(citing, Celotex Corp. 
'Ou 
v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986)). Plaintiffs fail to establish several 
elements essential to their claim of negligence. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is granted. 
An essential element of a negligence claim is a duty of reasonable care. "Absent a showing 
of duty, [the plaintiff] cannot recover." SliszevStanley-Bostich 979 P.2d317(1999) (quoting, AMS 
Salt Indus. V.Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942P.2d315, 319 (Utah 1997)). Plaintiffs fail to prove that 
defendants had a duty to control the operation or installation of the ventilation system. Furthermore, 
plaintiffs fail to persuade this Court that any legally cognizable duty, sufficient to support a claim 
of negligence, exists between the plaintiffs and defendant. 
Another critical element of a negligence claim is causation. In this case, plaintiffs have the 
burden of proving both that they were exposed to chemicals and that the levels of exposure causes 
known toxic effects. At the hearing and in supporting memorandum plaintiffs fail to meet this 
burden. Specifically, plaintiffs are unable to prove exposure to any chemicals, let alone levels 
known to cause known toxic effects. 
Finally, to prevail in a negligence claim, plaintiffs must prove damages. Plaintiffs assert that 
repeated chemical exposure caused them to develop significant health problems, primarily, Multiple 
Chemical Sensitivity, or "MCS"1. MCS is a controversial diagnosis that has been excluded in 
numerous jurisdictions for lack of sound scientific reasoning and methodology. See generally, 
Bradley v Brown 42 F.3d 434 (1994), Summers v Missouri Pacific Railroad System 132 F.3d 599 
]In addition to MCS, Dr. Deborah Robinson, diagnosed both plaintiffs with chronic 
fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia while Dr Janiece Pompa diagnosed plaintiff Jones with 
cognitive deficits. These diagnoses appear to essentially be MCS couched in different terms. 
Plaintiffs own experts admits that all of the illnesses display nearly identical symptoms and show 
significant overlap in numerous other respects. 
(1997), Collins v Welch 178 Misc.2d 107, Treadwell vDow-United Technologies 970 F. Supp 974 
(M.D.Ala. 1997). Furthermore, numerous medical organizations, including the American Medical 
Association, refuse to accept MCS as a valid and reliable diagnosis. After careful consideration, 
this Court concludes that plaintiffs evidence and testimony offered in support of MCS is not 
admissible. Plaintiffs evidence is not based upon inherently reliable scientific or medical foundation 
as required under Rimmasch and Utah Rules of Evidence 702. Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to 
establish the existence of damages, an element essential to their claim of negligence. 
Therefore, for the above mentioned reasons, the Court having reviewed the legal memoranda, 
affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties, and being fully advised, concludes that plaintiff has 
failed to prove a legal cause of action for negligence and accordingly defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Dated this y day oOtlly, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
^^^^t^4^ 
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